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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate how Cognitive Radio as a means of communication can be
utilized to serve a smart grid deployment end to end, from a home area network to power generation.
We show how Cognitive Radio can be mapped to integrate the possible different communication
networks within a smart grid large scale deployment. In addition, various applications in smart grid
are defined and discussed showing how Cognitive Radio can be used to fulfill their communication
requirements. Moreover, information security issues pertained to the use of Cognitive Radio in
a smart grid environment at different levels and layers are discussed and mitigation techniques
are suggested. Finally, the well-known Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is integrated with the
Cognitive Radio part of a smart grid communication network to protect against unauthorized access
to customer’s data and to the network at large.
Keywords: cognitive radio; information security; smart grid; role-based access control

1. Introduction
The current electrical power grid is a centrally controlled network that is located over a large
geographic area with an enormous number of systems and devices, starting from the power generation
plant all the way to the customer side. This traditional power grid faces many challenges such
as rising energy demand, aging infrastructure, reliability and security issues [1]. Moreover, there
is an increasingly growing attention on integrating renewable energy resources with the existing
fuel-based power generation for both economic and environmental concerns. This issue raises the
need for the traditional power grid to cope with these challenges and evolve toward intelligence in
power generation, transmission, distribution, and billing. This can be achieved by moving to the
next-generation power grid, which is known as smart grid.
Smart grid is a two-way communication enabled power grid, in which electrical power generation
is integrated with emerging technologies such as wireless communication, pervasive computing,
and adaptive control to substantially improve the efficiency, reliability and sustainability. Significant
benefits are achieved from adopting smart grid networks including: economic benefits (reducing
generation and distribution cost, managing consumption and bill pricing, controlling grid failure and
power outage), and environmental benefits (saving energy through demand response management,
integrating renewable/distributed energy resources) [2].
Starting from power generation systems (traditional and/or renewable) through transmission/
distribution systems to customers (industrial, commercial and/or residential), smart grid combines all
these sub-networks within one intelligent network with bidirectional flow of electricity and information.
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grid combines all these sub-networks within one intelligent network with bidirectional flow of
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networks is not unique as a strategy, its importance can be derived from several factors showing it
to be an effective choice. For example, using CR allows for an integrated communication solution to
be used across the large scale smart grid communication network while utilizing existing resources.
Another advantage of using CR in smart grid is related to the possibility of providing different end to
end QoS to different applications based on their needs. Pervasiveness is another feature providing
the different users of smart grid with anytime, anywhere connectivity to fulfill their needs. Further
motivations behind the use of CR in smart grid are outlined in the next section.
Our contribution in this paper is to investigate using cognitive radio as a communication
technology in smart grid, identify and discuss relevant security issues, and integrate the Role-Based
Access Control Model (RBAC) [8] into the environment in order to control access to the network, thus,
protects both users’ and utility companies’ data from improper disclosure. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows: an overview of cognitive radio paradigm in smart grid is provided in Section 2.
We present a list of vulnerabilities and potential security attacks related to using cognitive radio
for smart grid communication along with their mitigation techniques in Section 3. In Section 4, we
introduce an access control mechanism based on the well-known Role-Based Access Control Model to
manage, securely, the communication within smart grid. Section 5 presents security analysis for the
proposed access control mechanism and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Cognitive Radio for Smart Grid Networks
The Communication infrastructure in smart grid is required to perform three fundamental
functions: sensing, transmission and control. Smart grid is usually deployed over a large geographical
area, where the communication infrastructure has to cover the entire area and connect a large number
of nodes. A cognitive radio based multi-layer communication infrastructure is proposed in [1] to
ensure reliable communication within smart grid. This multi-layer structure consists of three main
layers (areas): the home area network (HAN), the neighborhood area network (NAN) and the wide
area network (WAN).
Home area networks (HANs) are consumer networks that connect, and communicate with various
“home/premises” smart devices to collect real-time energy consumption data. One of those devices
with a special importance is the smart meter that plays a major role in the smart grid paradigm. Smart
meters are part of this network. Smart meters are the basic components used to collect and deliver
power consumption information to remote utilities much more effectively than the conventional
meters. Smart meters measure the load profile and demand, store historical information and act as a
meter or as a meter/gateway. Using smart meters will also help utility companies monitor the peak
load through consumer participation and control electricity consumption. In addition to consumers’
premises, smart meters can be deployed as part of the distribution power network and primary and
secondary power stations for an end to end command and control. Outside the HAN, a neighborhood
area network (NAN) connect multiple HANs to local access points, and wide area network (WAN)
controls communication between multiple NANs and the utility control center to achieve energy
efficiency and demand/response management.
2.1. Motivations
Several motivations drive using cognitive radio for communication in smart grid networks. Some
of these motivations are summarized as follows:
‚

Smart meters within the HAN usually operate in the 2.4 GHz license-free industrial, scientific
and medical (ISM) frequency band for economic reasons. However, there is a number of
radio technologies operating in this band (e.g., Bluetooth, Zigbee, U-LTE and WiFi) resulting
in significant interference to each other. This imposes significant challenges to the HAN and
threatens the reliable data communication within smart grid. Therefore, the need for cognitive
radio technology in HANs is vital to reduce interference between these technologies using
intelligent transmission scheduling and power coordination techniques.
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The available spectrum for wireless technologies is limited and underutilized due to the static
frequency allocation schemes. Therefore, using cognitive radio in smart grid increases spectrum
utilization and results in more capacity to support increasing traffic growth.
The proposed multi-layer communication architecture for the smart grid is essentially a
heterogeneous network that needs to communicate over three networks: HAN, NAN and WAN.
Therefore, cognitive radio would be a good fit to ensure coverage and convergence of the whole
smart grid, where smart grid components need to be equipped with cognitive radio functionalities.
Cognitive radio can utilize white spaces within the local TV band spectrum for low-latency
communications, which improves the overall performance of the smart grid network.
Smart grid network is usually a large scale network that is distributed over a large geographic
area. Hence, multiple communication networks can coexist within a single smart grid, and using
cognitive radio guarantees fair spectrum sharing among those networks.
Using cognitive radio capabilities allow smart grid applications and services to use different
spectrum regulations that may exist within this large scale network while achieving the desired
QoSs. Using cognitive radio functionalities, data transmission can be scheduled to achieve
differential QoS based on the priority of the transmitted data [9], where data priority is defined
according to the role and location of the smart grid user.
Cognitive radio offers a cost-effective solution to extend the coverage area of the whole smart
grid without the need to install more switches and routers, in the wired communication case, or
wireless access points and base stations, in the wireless communication case. This can be achieved
by using cognitive radio-based standards such as IEEE 802.22 [7,10]. Furthermore, Operating cost
of the cognitive network is optimized under real-time pricing where macrocell and femtocell base
stations adjust their power consumption based on electricity prices [11].
Cognitive radio provides an energy-efficient technology for data communication in smart grid,
with optimum data transmission duration and high average data throughput [12].

Cognitive radio in HAN operates in the license-free band to coordinate the heterogeneous wireless
technologies. While in NAN and WAN cognitive communication operates in licensed bands to
utilize unoccupied spectrum opportunities. In the next section we explore various communication
technologies pertained CR in more details.
2.2. IEEE Standards Related to CR
There are several IEEE standard developments, which are related to the adoption of CR
communications as a technology. In this paper, we discuss three of these IEEE standards.
IEEE 802.22: The IEEE 802.22 standard is developed to define the air interface in wireless regional
area networks (WRAN) to access available TV white spaces using cognitive radio as a technology. It
benefits from the good propagation characteristics of TV channels, operating in the VHF and UHF
spectrum regions, to provide a broadband access for rural and regional areas with an extended
coverage area (33–100 km) [7].
The IEEE 802.22 standard operates as a point-to-multipoint (P2MP) network, where a base station
(BS) and a number of customer premises equipment (CPE) form a cell. The BS controls the medium
access of all CPEs, transmits data to the CPEs in the downlink, and receives data from the CPEs in
the uplink. To ensure reliable communication and prevent harmful interference to the primary users
(PUs), spectrum sensing is performed. There are two methods considered for spectrum sensing. In
the first method, the BS transmits location information via a GPS device to a centralized database,
which has information about the PU activity in the different TV channels, and the database replies
back with the available TV channels within the coverage area of the BS. In the second method, the BS
locally determines the availability of free TV channels based on its sensing information or sensing
information received from the CPEs. The CPEs perform distributed sensing and then periodically send
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sensing information to the BS, which gathers the information and makes a decision whether to keep
communication in the current channel or move to another available channel.
The IEEE 802.22 PHY layer employs orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA)
modulation scheme for transmission in the uplink and downlink, to efficiently adjust and allocate the
available bandwidth. With OFDMA the BS can smoothly change the operating channel, when claimed
by the primary user, to another free channel without affecting communication with the CPEs. The MAC
layer adopts cognitive radio and performs two types of spectrum sensing: fast and fine sensing. In fast
sensing, both CPEs and BS perform sensing quickly (at a speed under 1 ms per channel) to exploit
the changes in spectrum occupancy and decide if transmission needs to be moved to another channel.
Then, the BS initiates fine sensing based on the results of the fast sensing stage, in which sensing
takes longer time (about 25 ms per channel). Simple sensing techniques such as energy detection are
used in fast sensing, while more accurate sensing techniques such as matched-filter detection and
cyclostationary-feature detection are employed in fine sensing [7].
IEEE 802.19.1 Standard: The IEEE 802.19.1 was developed for “TV White Space Coexistence
Methods” [13,14]. This standard defines three mainly needed mechanisms for achieving coexistence
between different CR systems operating within the TV white space frequency bands. One is the
discovery of systems that need to coexist with each other. This is achieved by employing a logical
entity called a coexistence discovery and information server (CDIS) which uses certain parameters
to discover radio systems, which can be considered as neighbors, i.e., interference between them is
possible, within the TV white space radio system. These parameters include .the locations of the white
space radio systems and their radiated power characteristics.
Second is the modification of operating parameters of these systems to achieve better performance.
This can be done through two services provided by the standard: information service and management
service. The information service relies on neighbor discovery parameter information, which is
periodically provided to the white space radio system to autonomously update its operating parameters.
As for the management service, the coexistence system manages the operating parameters of a white
space radio system through an employed logical entity called a coexistence manager, which collects
registration information from the CDIS serving the neighboring various radio systems in addition to
information on the available frequency bands. These information are then evaluated and coexistence
decisions are made.
Third is the providing of a unified interface between the different types of radio systems and
a coexistence system. This service is achieved through defining a logical entity called a coexistence
enabler to provide a unified interface between a white space radio system and the IEEE 802.19.1
coexistence system. However, the standard only defines an abstract notion of this interface and leaves
its implementation up to the individual manufacturers.
IEEE 802.11af Standard: The IEEE 802.11af standard provides a framework to incorporate the
different operating parameters of licensed and unlicensed devises operating within the white space
radio system [15]. This is mainly concerned with preventing unlicensed devices from interfering with
existing licensed devices operating within the same band simultaneously. To enable and manage
spectrum sharing in the white space TV band a geo-location database containing a full knowledge
of licensed and unlicensed usage of the band can be implemented through two approaches: open
and closed-loop systems. The IEEE 802.11af standard provides a common framework for architecture,
communication and a control structure that allows standardization across these two approaches.
2.3. Cognitive Radio-Based Communication Infrastructure
In general, there are three CR communication paradigms that can be used in smart grid
environment: Interweave CR communication, Underlay CR communication, and Overlay CR
communication. In the interweave paradigm, the secondary user can access a certain frequency
band as long as no primary user’s activity is detected. However, once a primary user’s activity is
sensed, the secondary user has to vacate the band. In the underlay paradigm, secondary users transmit
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with low power, below the noise threshold of the primary user communication, to avoid interfering
with the primary user transmission. The underlay and interweave CR-based SG communication
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HGW can sense the spectrum and opportunistically access unused frequency bands, under certain
between the HAN and the external NAN. Moreover, the HGW manages communication within the
interference
constraints, in order to establish communication between the HAN and the external NAN.
HAN in the licensed-free spectrum, it assigns frequency channel and network address to the devices
Moreover, the HGW manages communication within the HAN in the licensed-free spectrum, it assigns
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A NAN is the intermediate layer that connects multiple HANs to the WAN of the utility company.
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company.
Load
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measured
by
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collected
HGWs to the NAN and then to the utility control center. Communication within the NAN is organized
and sent via HGWs to the NAN and then to the utility control center. Communication within the
using the NAN cognitive gateway (NGW), where the NGW connects multiple HGWs together as
NAN is organized using the NAN cognitive gateway (NGW), where the NGW connects multiple
shown in Figure 4.
HGWs together as shown in Figure 4.
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spectrum using cognitive radio technology, where the NGW is used as cognitive radio access point to
access point to transfer data and distribute the spectrum between multiple HGWs. However,
transfer data and distribute the spectrum between multiple HGWs. However, communication between
communication between HGWs and NGWs over the licensed band might be insufficient to
HGWs
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theincreasingly
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a
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dynamic
spectrum
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(H-DSA) paradigm
has over
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[1].band
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HGWs
In H-DSA,
HGWs
communicate
with NGWs
licensed
to ensure
QoS communicate
of data
withcommunication,
NGWs over thewhile
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band toaccess
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communication,
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unlicensed
is QoS
used of
to data
improve
capacity and while
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In theaccess
unlicensed
access,capacity
both HGWs
NGWs are considered
as secondary
users
andHGWs
can access
is used
to improve
andand
throughput.
In the unlicensed
access,
both
andthe
NGWs
unoccupied
spectrum
opportunistically.
This
paradigm
provides
cost-effective
and
reliable
are considered as secondary users and can access the unoccupied spectrum opportunistically. This
communication
smart grid. and reliable communication for smart grid.
paradigm
providesfor
cost-effective
TV white space (TVWS) can also be used for communication between HGWs and NGW within
TV white space (TVWS) can also be used for communication between HGWs and NGW within the
the NAN. However, interference between multiple NANs that coexist within the same geographical
NAN. However, interference between multiple NANs that coexist within the same geographical area
area should be taken into consideration. The authors in [17] proposed to allow the HGW to sense the

should be taken into consideration. The authors in [17] proposed to allow the HGW to sense the TVWS
channel declared available from incumbents by the White Space Database (WSDB) to discover the
presence of an interfering NAN. If the sensing result declares the TVWS channel as idle, the HGW can

discover the presence of an interfering NAN. If the sensing result declares the TVWS channel as idle,
the HGW can transmit over that channel. Otherwise, the HGW uses the unlicensed channel. The
sensing duration is designed to maximize the achievable data rate, by explicitly accounting for the
accuracy/overhead trade-off and the co-located NANs traffic patterns.
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2.4. Cognitive Radio Applications for Smart Grid Networks
2.4.1. Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) represents the entire measurement and collection system
including: smart meters at the customer side, communication network between customers and service
provider, and data management systems [18]. The amount of data generated and exchanged within the
smart grid is enormous and the need for reliable and secure communication infrastructure is crucial.
However, the presence of different communication technologies within smart grid makes it difficult to
build an end to end reliable communication infrastructure. For example, as mentioned earlier, smart
meters within the HAN communicate over the unlicensed ISM band, where interference is a significant
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issue that might affect the reliability of the communication backbone. Moreover, exchanging data
between access points and electric utility over the licensed band adds extra cost in establishing a
communication infrastructure for the smart grid. Therefore, using cognitive radio functionalities in
opportunistic spectrum access and spectrum sharing helps utilize the unused licensed spectrum to
achieve efficient data communication over the smart grid. CR enabled smart meters will be able to
sense the spectrum for channel availability to better utilize the available spectrum. The communication
overhead associated with such sensing will depends on several factors, such as the frequency of sensing,
availability of channels and the number of licensed users within the operational cell. Data transmission
can be scheduled using different channel selection mechanisms to guarantee the reliability and energy
efficiency. For example, data transmitted over the smart grid can be classified into two categories:
delay-sensitive data and non-delay-sensitive data. Using channel selection mechanisms such as the one
proposed in [19], delay-sensitive data is transmitted over reliable channel while non-delay-sensitive
data is transmitted over high SNR channel at a higher data rate.
2.4.2. Distributed Power Generation
The integration of traditional power sources and renewable energy sources is a special feature of
smart grid. In addition to generating clean energy, the use of renewable energy sources reduces the
burden on the increasingly overloaded traditional power sources. This helps in balancing the overall
power demand in smart grid. However, traditional and renewable power sources have differences in
price and availability. This raises the need for reliable communication and coordination to balance
their usage and monitor their operation for efficiency and safety purposes. To achieve this, wireless
networks can be used to provide cost-effective communication infrastructure for smart grid. However,
the performance of any wireless networks can be affected by many factors such as interference,
physical obstacles, network contention, and node failure. Therefore, using CR can be suitable to
increase communication reliability and efficiency using opportunistic spectrum access techniques
while taking into consideration acceptable communication overhead by dynamically adjusting the
sensing parameters based on performance indicators of the overall system.
2.4.3. Smart Grid Monitoring
Monitoring the operation of all smart grid components including generation utilities, transmission
lines, and the distribution utility is very important to ensure the consistency of high-level performance,
reliability, and efficiency of such systems. It is also vital to ensure effective and reliable demand
response management (DRM). Smart grid monitoring can be performed over licensed or unlicensed
frequency spectrum. While using the unlicensed spectrum can be efficient in terms of cost and
installation, it suffers from crowdedness interference. Moreover, the fact that smart grid is a large-scale
network makes it difficult to build a sensor network that can monitor the grid reliably due to
electromagnetic interference, maintenance, shadowing and fading issues [20]. Therefore, using
cognitive radio functionalities, such as spectrum sensing and opportunistic dynamic spectrum access,
helps achieve a reliable monitoring operation with high efficiency and minimal cost.
Monitoring the CR communication channels in smart grid produces an additional overhead
resulting from spectrum sensing. To deal with this extra traffic load, several algorithms have been
proposed. These algorithms aim to design an optimal sensing time while ensuring a reliable sensing
process. In [21], a two-way cognitive-switching procedure was proposed. A cost function, which
takes into account both the sensing-accuracy improvement gained and the transmission capacity
degradation induced due to increasing sensing time, is evaluated and an optimum sensing time is
derived. In [22], a joint optimization algorithm for sensing time and transmission time was also derived.
A sensing-performance tradeoff between better control performance and lower communication cost
was achieved by calculating the optimal sensing time value under the constraint that the licensed
primary user is sufficiently protected [23]. In addition, different spectrum sharing techniques have
been proposed to better utilize the licensed spectrum and ensure reliable communication between
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smart grid components. Some spectrum sharing techniques utilize the spectrum either in the space or
time dimension where more efficient ones utilize the spectrum in dimensions such as the joint spatial
and temporal spectrum sharing technique [24].
2.4.4. Electric Vehicles (G2V and V2G)
Growing environmental concerns motivated the work toward an economic and
environment-friendly replacement for the conventional fuel-operated vehicles. Therefore, electric
vehicles (EV) started to emerge the market as the future generation of transportation systems. Two
types of vehicles fall under the category of electric vehicles: fully electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles (PHEVs). EVs are integrated into smart grid in two paradigms, Grid-to-Vehicle (G2V)
and Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G).
In a G2V paradigm, EVs get their electricity supply from external power source within the smart
grid, where EVs batteries are charged upon request. The major concern in this paradigm, although
it is theoretically simple, is the additional load imposed on the grid during charging times. The
penetration of EVs within the grid affects load balancing and peak-demand management. In [25],
the authors presented a case study on the effect of PHEVs penetration on the existing distribution
systems in the Pacific Northwest. The study has shown that the existing distribution infrastructure
is capable of supporting 50% penetration of PHEVs with the 120 V smart-charging profile, which is
approximately 21.6% of the light duty vehicle (LDV) fleet. However, this exceeds the capacity of the
existing generation infrastructure that can support approximately 18% of the LDV fleet.
High penetration of EVs in addition to uncoordinated charging result in major challenges in smart
grid such as; overloading, power outages, and degradation in grid performance. To overcome these
challenges, large-scale EVs behavior should be analyzed using different methods such as queuing
theory. Charging stations are assumed to work as a queue serving arriving EVs. Using queuing theory
many parameters affecting EVs charging process can be analyzed such as; EVs arrival rate, queue
length, EV waiting time in the queue to be served, and number of EVs being served. Moreover, the
number of available charging stations, and their state (empty or full) can be predicted.
The second paradigm is V2G, where EVs are used to store and supply electric power to the grid.
This paradigm is motivated by the fact that the car in US is driven one hour a day on average [26].
Therefore, EVs can communicate and deliver power when they are parked and connected to the grid.
This can help in balancing load throughout the grid during peak times. However, proper and effective
operation of V2G is subject to uncertainty as it depends on the availability of EVs plugged into the
grid. Moreover, EVs can communicate with each other within a V2V paradigm using vehicular ad
hoc networks (VANET) technology, where they can exchange information about the location and
availability of charging stations. In addition, they can share their experience about the quality of
service provided by charging stations in terms of charging time and waiting time.
Up to this end, it is obvious that EVs need reliable communication links with the generation and
distribution infrastructures in smart grid to ensure effective demand/supply operation and charging
coordination. For example, an EV has to communicate with the grid and send a charging request to
acquire power supply for charging its battery in the G2V paradigm. Therefore, information about
available charging stations, their locations, and the amount of time that the EV needs to wait before
being served has to be available for the EV sending the charging request. Moreover, in the V2G
paradigm, the grid has to communicate with EVs to check their availability within a certain location,
or the time at which they will be available to supply the grid with electricity. This implies that smart
grid certain entities and EVs need to communicate reliably and continuously exchanging information.
However, dedicating certain frequency bands to accommodate communication between EVs and smart
grid entities is inefficient especially when considering the cost of frequency spectrum licenses and the
growing number of EVs over time. Therefore, cognitive radio as a technology can be considered as an
effective communication alternative for this application, where opportunistic spectrum access can be
used to manage EVs and grid communication by utilizing unused frequency bands. Besides, using
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cognitive radio makes the smart grid adaptive to an increasing number of EVs, helps balance the load,
and utilizes the available power resources through proper allocation of EVs charging requests.
3. Security Issues Related to Cognitive Radio in Smart Grid Networks
Data exchanged within smart grid networks is valuable and confidential for both customers and
utility companies, as it carries critical information such as energy consumption, active appliances,
customer’s name/address, and payment information. Therefore, any communication infrastructure
designed for smart grid should emphasize security to guarantee reliable and efficient performance.
Following are the main security requirements that need to be considered when designing a security
framework for smart grid communication infrastructure.
Privacy: As mentioned earlier, information related to consumers is private and needs to remain
confidential when transmitted over the smart grid network. To achieve this, every smart meter,
gateway, and server within the smart grid has to implement some measures to ensure confidentiality.
Smart meters within the HAN are authenticated by the HAN cognitive gateway (HGW) and HGWs
are authenticated by the utility company. This hierarchal approach provides a scalable solution that
ensures the provision of secure communication within the smart grid [27].
Integrity: Integrity refers to the protection against unauthorized modification of data while it
is in transit. In smart grid, the integrity of data exchanged over its networks can be subject to many
attacks such as data falsification [28], data injection [29], message replay, and message delay [30]. These
attacks can negatively affect a smart grid operation given the amount of data and the sensitivity of
information being transmitted over the grid.
Availability: Availability refers to adequate system resources being always available when needed.
A malicious user can target smart grid availability by connecting to communication channels within
the grid and initiating DoS attacks. This results in delaying/blocking data from authorized users and
corrupting communication between smart grid components. Therefore, violating availability in smart
grid communication networks dramatically degrades the overall performance of the grid [31].
Authentication: Authentication refers to determining the identity of any subject (user, process or
device) trying to join the smart grid network, and verifying provided credentials against information
stored in a database.
Authorization: Authorization controls the access to smart grid and prevents illegitimate users
from acquiring data or issuing commands to the control system. Achieving other security objectives
such as, privacy and integrity mostly depends on the authorization stage.
In addition to the general security requirements mentioned above, using cognitive radio as a
technology for communication in smart grid introduces its own vulnerabilities and security concerns as
with all other wireless communication technologies. Moreover, the fact that cognitive radio dynamically
adjusts its parameters according to the surrounding radio environment creates new opportunities for
more attacks. In this paper, we focus on security attacks in cognitive radio networks and their impact
on the operation of the cognitive radio-based communication infrastructure when applied in a smart
grid network.
To better understand and analyze the possible attacks on the cognitive radio network, we first
introduce the main functionalities of such network.
Four main cognitive functionalities are performed to set up communication in a cognitive radio
network. As shown in Figure 6, these functionalities are spectrum sensing, spectrum management,
spectrum sharing, and spectrum mobility [32]. Spectrum sensing is performed to exploit spectrum
holes (opportunities) for unlicensed access, and spectrum management is executed to utilize these
opportunities without causing interference to the primary user. Moreover, spectrum sharing allows
the secondary user to share the spectrum with the primary user and other secondary users, where the
IEEE 802.22, IEEE 802.19.1 and 802.11af standards are developed to manage this functionality. Finally,
spectrum mobility allows secondary users to move to another empty frequency band after vacating
the current band for the primary user.

affected by security attacks: policy radio and learning radio [33,34]. Policy radio has a reasoning
engine that determines the status of a frequency band based on the current activity of the primary
user. Therefore, the effect of the attack disappears whenever the attacker leaves the channel. On the
other hand, learning radio has a reasoning and learning engine that uses both the current and past
information
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Moreover, cognitive radio networks can operate in two modes; non-collaborative and
The operation of these functionalities and hence the performance of the whole cognitive radio
collaborative. In the non-collaborative mode, one secondary user senses the channel and decides
network can be affected by security attacks. Two types of cognitive radio can be identified to be
whether it is occupied by the primary user or not. While in the collaborative mode, multiple
affected by security attacks: policy radio and learning radio [33,34]. Policy radio has a reasoning
secondary users sense the channel and exchange their information with each other, in the case of
engine that determines the status of a frequency band based on the current activity of the primary
distributed spectrum sensing, or send their information to a spectrum manager (fusion center), in
user. Therefore, the effect of the attack disappears whenever the attacker leaves the channel. On the
the case of centralized spectrum sensing, to decide upon the status of the channel. Collaborative
other hand, learning radio has a reasoning and learning engine that uses both the current and past
sensing is used to achieve higher sensing accuracy by overcoming some sensing issues such as;
information of the primary user activity to predict the status of a frequency band. Hence, resulting in a
hidden primary user problem, multipath fading, and shadowing. However, collaborative sensing
long-term effect of the security attack on the cognitive radio network.
can be highly affected by possible security attacks as the attacker may send false data to the fusion
Moreover, cognitive radio networks can operate in two modes; non-collaborative and
center and affect the final decision regarding the primary user’s presence [35].
collaborative. In the non-collaborative mode, one secondary user senses the channel and decides
In the case of smart grid networks, security attacks can affect the reliability and efficiency of the
whether it is occupied by the primary user or not. While in the collaborative mode, multiple secondary
cognitive radio-based communication infrastructure by reducing the overall throughput of the
users sense the channel and exchange their information with each other, in the case of distributed
network. For example, if the attack is performed within a NAN, where cognitive radio is used to
spectrum sensing, or send their information to a spectrum manager (fusion center), in the case of
organize communication and allocate available spectrum opportunities between multiple HGWs, an
centralized spectrum sensing, to decide upon the status of the channel. Collaborative sensing is used
attacker might disrupt communication between the NGW and the HGWs. In addition, an attack can
to achieve higher sensing accuracy by overcoming some sensing issues such as; hidden primary user
be launched within a WAN, where a CR base station is used to manage communication between
problem, multipath fading, and shadowing. However, collaborative sensing can be highly affected by
multiple NGWs and the utility company control center. In this case, the attacker can fool the CR base
possible security attacks as the attacker may send false data to the fusion center and affect the final
station and the spectrum broker to consider him as a primary user, resulting in reduction in
decision regarding the primary user’s presence [35].
spectrum opportunities available for the NGWs to communicate with the control center. Figure 7
In the case of smart grid networks, security attacks can affect the reliability and efficiency of
shows an example of security attack within cognitive radio-based communication infrastructure in
the cognitive radio-based communication infrastructure by reducing the overall throughput of the
both a NAN and a WAN.
network. For example, if the attack is performed within a NAN, where cognitive radio is used to
organize communication and allocate available spectrum opportunities between multiple HGWs, an
attacker might disrupt communication between the NGW and the HGWs. In addition, an attack can
be launched within a WAN, where a CR base station is used to manage communication between
multiple NGWs and the utility company control center. In this case, the attacker can fool the CR base
station and the spectrum broker to consider him as a primary user, resulting in reduction in spectrum
opportunities available for the NGWs to communicate with the control center. Figure 7 shows an
example of security attack within cognitive radio-based communication infrastructure in both a NAN
and a WAN.
The following subsections describe the different security attacks against cognitive radio-based
communications and provide proper mitigation mechanisms to defend against these attacks.
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In [38], the authors proposed a transmitter verification scheme called localization based defense
(LocDef). This scheme utilizes the underlying wireless sensor network to collect data about the received
signal strength (RSS) across the cognitive radio network. Based on the strong correlation between the
RSS and the distance between transmitter and receiver, the collected data is smoothed and the location
of the transmitter is identified.
3.2. Jamming
In jamming, a malicious user transmits over the licensed channel to make it unavailable for both
the primary user and the secondary users; resulting in a denial of service situation. The jammer can
transmit over the channel continuously to force other secondary users take a false decision, or he may
jam the common control channel (CCC) used to exchange sensing information and disrupt the overall
communication within the cognitive radio network. This kind of jamming can easily be applied within
a HAN thus denying proper communication between the HGW, smart meters, and home appliances.
There are four types of jammers: constant jammer, deceptive jammer, random jammer, and
reactive jammer [39]. The constant jammer continuously transmits random bits without waiting
for the channel to be idle and regardless of the MAC-layer protocols. Therefore, with this constant
transmission performed by the jammer, other secondary users will always make false decisions about
the sensed channel and will not be able to access it. Examples of a constant jammer are a waveform
generator or a normal wireless device. The deceptive jammer continuously transmits regular packets
with zero inter-departure time between transmissions. It forces other users to stay in the receiving
mode whether they have data to transmit or not, as they are deceived by the constant stream of
transmissions. The random jammer switches between jamming and sleeping modes. For example, it
may jam for t j time slots and then sleeps for ts time slots in order to save its energy. In addition, during
jamming periods it may act as a constant or as a deceptive jammer. On the other hand, the reactive
jammer is different from the three types of jammers mentioned above in the sense that it remains
quiet as long as the channel is idle and jams the channel whenever it detects communication. From
the jammer’s point of view, this type of jamming is inefficient in terms of energy consumption, as the
jammer needs to sense the channel all the time to capture any activity. However, it is hard to detect the
reactive jammer since jamming is not performed continuously.
Mitigation Techniques for Jamming:
Before discussing jamming mitigation, it is important to discuss jamming detection. Different
techniques exist to detect a jammer. In [39], a jamming detection technique, known as Signal Strength
Consistency Check, is proposed. This check is based on the signal strength (SS) and the packet
delivery ratio (PDR). The PDR can be measured either at the transmitter side, as the number of
acknowledgements received from the receiver; or on the receiver side, as the number of packets that
pass the CRC check with respect to the number of packets received. When no packets are received,
the PDR will be zero. In jamming-free wireless network, a certain node will measure high SS and
high PDR from its close neighboring nodes. However, under jamming attacks, this node will measure
high SS and low PDR at the same time. Another test that can be performed to detect jamming is the
Location Consistency Check. This check is based on the location of the nodes, where the location can
be acquired using GPS. Under normal conditions, any node should measure high PDR value from its
close neighbors. However, when this node captures low PDR from a neighboring node, this means
that the neighboring node is under a jamming attack.
Defending against jamming attacks is the next step after detecting such attacks. In [40], two
approaches to defend against jamming have been proposed; channel surfing, and spatial retreats. In
the channel surfing approach, both the transmitter and the receiver move their communication to
another channel once jamming is detected on the current channel. Channel surfing can be performed
physically using frequency hopping, under the assumption that the jammer can jam only one channel at
a time and does not have an access to the authentication key. The second approach is the spatial retreats,
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where the nodes move their location outside the interference range of the jammer. However, some
coordination between moving nodes should exist to guarantee that they stay within the communication
range of each other and escape from the jammer at the same time. This technique is effective in the case
of wireless networks with mobile nodes. In a smart grid network, this can be best seen to be applied in
the previously discussed applications of V2G, G2V and V2V communication.
3.3. Objective Function Attack
The main feature of cognitive radio is its ability to sense the surrounding radio environment
and adjust its radio parameters accordingly. These parameters include; power, bandwidth, center
frequency, modulation type, coding rate, channel access protocol, frame size, and encryption type. By
solving the objective function, these parameters can be defined in order to achieve certain transmission
requirements such as a high level of security, and a high data rate. In the objective function attack,
the attacker manipulates the parameters, which he can control and change the sensing results. The
authors in [33] discussed an objective function attack example, where the following objective function
is considered with wi as weights, p as power, r as transmission rate, and s as security.
f “ w1 p ` w2 r ` w3 s

(1)

Cognitive radio solves the objective function to minimize power consumption p, maximize
transmission rate r, and maximize security level s. However, if the attacker aims to lower security level
s, then whenever the cognitive radio system tries to send data at high security level, the attacker will
jam the channel resulting in lower transmission rate and hence lower objective function. Therefore, the
cognitive radio system will readjust its parameters and send high security data at lower security level.
Mitigation Techniques for Objective Function Attack:
A simple solution to defend against the objective function attack has been proposed in [41]. It is
based on defining a threshold for every adjustable radio parameter, and if any parameter does not
meet the threshold, communication will stop. Another solution to overcome this attack is proposed
in [42] using the neighborhood majority voting approach. In this approach, each secondary user
collects sensing reports from its immediate neighbors and performs a spatial correlation test to decide
the legality of its neighbors. The results are broadcasted to the neighboring nodes, and if a node
receives more than half of its neighbor votes announcing it as a suspicious node, then this node will
be considered as a malicious node. In a smart grid network, this can be applied in a NAN where
collaborative communication can be utilized between HGWs when communicating with a NGA.
3.4. Byzantine Attack
The Byzantine attack, also known as spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF), happens when
an attacker sends false spectrum sensing data and results in wrong sensing decision. By sending false
data, to the fusion center in the case of centralized collaborative sensing or to other secondary users in
the case of distributed collaborative sensing, legitimate secondary users will either be denied from
accessing a free channel or admitted to a busy channel causing interference to the primary user. The
severity of this attack is higher in the case of distributed sensing, as sensing information propagates
among secondary users faster. While in centralized sensing, the fusion center can control and detect
false data by comparing sensing information from different secondary users.
Mitigation Techniques for Byzantine Attack:
A mitigation technique to detect malicious nodes based on a trust approach and pre-filtering
techniques is proposed in [43]. Malicious nodes are classified into two types: “Always Yes” and
“Always No”. An “Always Yes” node sends positive sensing data all the time indicating that the
primary user is present; hence it increases the probability of false detection. While an “Always No”
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A trust approach, to the control channel saturation attack, is proposed in [45] based on
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Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT). In this approach, neighboring nodes of the secondary user
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communication within smart grid networks on one hand, and affect service providers and customers
on the other hand. More precisely, security attacks result in communication disruption by either
on the other hand. More precisely, security attacks result in communication disruption by either
delaying communication or causing denial of service. Therefore, this will have major consequences
delaying communication or causing denial of service. Therefore, this will have major consequences on
the smart grid from economical, technical, and social perspectives. From a service provider’s point of
view, security attacks will affect collecting and exchanging data that is important for grid monitoring,
fault detection, demand/supply management, and bill pricing. Economic consequences will arise due
to the lack of reliable communication between smart grid elements, where power outages will be more
frequent and power demand/supply will not be controlled and managed properly. Furthermore, these
attacks can result in life-threatening consequences, when the grid is not well-monitored and faults are
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not detected or controlled. From a customers’ perspective, security threats will affect their experience
and satisfaction, as their information will be vulnerable to attacks resulting in the violation of their
privacy and miss representation of their data. This will discourage them from being part of the smart
grid paradigm and affect the spread and development of smart grid networks.
The above mentioned CR attacks can easily be exploited to have a direct impact on smart grid.
These vulnerabilities might allow attackers to access the smart grid network, break the confidentiality
and integrity of transmitted data, and make services unavailable. Next we list other vulnerabilities
that are most serious in smart grids:
‚

‚

‚

‚

Exposure of customer’s private data: Smart meters autonomously collect massive amounts of
data, which includes consumers’ private data, and transport it to the utility company, consumers,
and service providers. If not protected, this data can be used to infer consumer’s activities, devices
being used, and times when the home is vacant.
Physical security: Smart grid network includes many components and most of them are out of the
utility’s premises. This fact increases the number of insecure physical locations and makes them
vulnerable to physical access.
Exploitation of intelligent devices: A smart grid includes several intelligent devices that are used
in managing the electricity supply and demand network. Exploitation of such devices can lead to
easy entry points for attacking the network.
Insider attacks: The fact that smart grid has many stakeholders that can give raise to a very
dangerous attack known as the insider attack. Insiders can be driven by different motives and
expertise to utilize their access and exploit different vulnerabilities causing damage to the network.
Attackers could be script kiddies, elite hackers, terrorists, employees, competitors, or customers.

4. Access Control Model for Smart Grid Networks
In the case of cognitive radio-based communication for smart grid, the access of secondary users
to licensed bands should be controlled to avoid causing interference to primary users. Moreover,
secondary users should have the permission to terminate the connection whenever a malicious user is
detected. Therefore, the need to develop an access control mechanism that enforces access policies
in cognitive-based communication within smart grid networks, and alleviates the effect of security
attacks on smart grid performance and privacy is crucial.
An efficient access control model should be used to guarantee that only authorized users can
access the collected data, control sent data and measurements. In this paper, we propose an integration
of the well-known access control model called Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) with cognitive
radio-based communication within smart grid to ensure proper management and access policies
enforcement. RBAC can be used to control the access to smart meters during the communication
phase. It allows the owners of smart meter services to control who can identify smart meters locations,
approve or disapprove their subsequent connections, based on a set of parameters [8]. Moreover,
RBAC supports some important security principles such as least privilege, separation of duties, and
data abstraction, which can help in mitigating the risks associated with some of the threats that can
lead to the attacks described above. Least privilege is supported, because RBAC can be configured
such that only those permissions are assigned to the role required for the tasks conducted by members
of the role. Separation of duties is achieved by ensuring that mutually exclusive roles must be invoked
to complete a sensitive task, such as requiring a cognitive radio base station and a spectrum data
base for sensing spectrum and assigning available frequency bands. Data abstraction is supported by
means of abstract permissions such as join, leave, join as a sender, join as a receiver, etc. rather than
just read, write and execute permissions typically provided by the operating system. Finally, through
its role hierarchy feature, RBAC can be used to “securely” manage communications between HANs,
NANs, and WANs, which are also of a hierarchical structure. The following section briefly describes
the proposed RBAC model.
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Role hierarchy (RH) in RBAC is a natural way of organizing roles to reflect the organization’s
lines of authority and responsibility. The hierarchy is partially ordered, so it is reflexive, transitive, and
anti-symmetric. Inheritance is reflexive because a role inherits its own permissions. Transitivity is a
natural requirement in this context, and anti-symmetry rules out roles that inherit from one another
and are therefore redundant.
5. RBAC Integration for Cognitive Radio in Smart Grid
This section discusses how RBAC is used to manage and control the cognitive radio-based
communication infrastructure for smart grid. First, system requirements and design goals are stated,
then, access control policies for these requirements are specified, and finally, an access control model to
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permissions

Each
group maps each role to a set of permissions based on the sensitivity level of the roles
or junior).
(senior
or junior).
‚
Each group
has rules to control who can join the group as sender only.
‚ Each
group
has
Each group has rules
rules to
to control
control who
who can
can join
join the
the group
group as
as sender
receiveronly.
only.

Each group has rules to control who can join the group as receiver only.
‚
Each group has rules to control who can access data.

Each group has rules to control who can access data.
‚
Sending, receiving, and delivering data are treated as permissions.

Sending, receiving, and delivering data are treated as permissions.
‚
Access to customers’ data is treated as a permission.

Access to customers’ data is treated as a permission.
‚
Spectrum sensing
sensing is
is treated
treated as
as aa permission.
permission.

Spectrum
Definitions:
Definitions:

‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚
‚

E: aa set
set active
active system
system entities
entities such
such as;
as; users,
users, autonomous
autonomous agents,
agents, etc.
etc.
E:
S: aa set
set of
of sessions
sessions
S:
R: aa set
set of
of roles
roles
R:
P: aa set
set of
of permissions
permissions
P:
T:
T: aa set
set of
of message
message types
UA_R
⊆
U
UA_R Ď U×ˆ R,
R, is
is many
many to
to many
many User
User to
to Role
Role assignment
assignment relation
relation
PA_R
⊆
P
×
R,
is
many
to
many
Permission
to
Role assignment
assignment relation
relation
PA_R Ď P ˆ R, is many to many Permission to Role

According
According to
toRBAC
RBAC model,
model, access
access to
to the
the system
system data
data is
is authorized
authorized using
using the
the following
following relation:
relation:
Can-access ⊆ R × R
Can ´ access Ď R ˆ R
The meaning of (x, cr, z)  can-access is that a system active entity (a subject) can access a data
item (an
if the
following
hold: The subject
a member
of aentity
role (x),
and whose
Theobject)
meaning
of (x,
cr, z) P can-access
is that is
a system
active
(a subject)
can membership
access a data
in
x allows
himifto
z, based
This(x),
means
that the
permission
item
(an object)
theaccess
following
hold:on
Thepre-request
subject is a condition
member ofcr.
a role
and whose
membership
in
assigned
to x’storoles
must
allowon
access,
otherwise
accesscr.is This
denied.
x allows him
access
z, based
pre-request
condition
means that the permission assigned to
In our
model,
assume
that allaccess
security
decisions pertain to the administrative activities in
x’s roles
must
allowwe
access,
otherwise
is denied.
RBAC,
as the user-role
assignments
and permission-role
assignments,
are handled byactivities
a security
Insuch
our model,
we assume
that all security
decisions pertain
to the administrative
in
officer
at the control
center.and permission-role assignments, are handled by a security
RBAC,who
suchisaslocated
the user-role
assignments
officer who is located at the control center.
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5.2.
5.2. Enforcement
Enforcement Facilities
Facilities
One
One of
of the
the most
most critical
critical issues
issues in
in using
using RBAC
RBAC for
for enforcing
enforcing the
the specified
specified access
access policies
policies in
in
cognitive-based
smart
grid
environment
is
to
use
the
concept
of
a
reference
monitor
(RM),
which
cognitive-based smart grid environment is to use the concept of a reference monitor (RM), which
has
has
introduced,
extensively
discussed
theaccess
accesscontrol
controlcommunity
communityfor
for years,
years, and
and has
beenbeen
introduced,
andand
extensively
discussed
byby
the
has
become
the
ISO
standard
for
access
control
framework
[47].
The
RM
concept
has
been
considered
become the ISO standard for access control framework [47]. The RM concept has been considered as
as
the
the core
core control
control mechanism
mechanism for
for access
access and
and usage
usage of
of digital
digital information.
information. In
In classical
classical access
access control,
control,
subjects
subjects can
can access
access digital
digital objects
objects only
only through
through the
the reference
reference monitor,
monitor, which
which is
is aa process
process inside
inside the
the
trusted
computer
base
that
is
always
running
and
is
a
tamper
proof.
trusted computer base that is always running and is a tamper proof.
The
The following
following section
section discusses
discusses our
our conceptual
conceptual structure
structureof
ofRBAC/CR
RBAC/CR access
access control
control domains
domains
based
on
the
reference
monitor.
In
our
architecture,
a
customized
version
of
the
well-known
based on the reference monitor. In our architecture, a customized version of the well-known ISO
ISO
reference
the
call
control
center.
According
to this
ISOISO
standard,
the
referencemonitor
monitorstandard
standardisisplaced
placedinside
inside
the
call
control
center.
According
to this
standard,
reference
monitor
consists
of twooffacilities:
AccessAccess
Control
Enforcement
FacilityFacility
(AEF) and
Access
the reference
monitor
consists
two facilities:
Control
Enforcement
(AEF)
and
Decision
Facility
(ADF).
The
AEF
and
ADF
interact
with
each
other
in
such
way
that
every
request
by
Access Decision Facility (ADF). The AEF and ADF interact with each other in such way that every
arequest
subjectby
to aaccess
an
object
in
the
system
get
intercepted
by
AEF.
The
AEF
in
turn
asks
the
ADF
for
a
subject to access an object in the system get intercepted by AEF. The AEF in turn asks
decision
to on
approve
or disapprove
thedisapprove
request, and
ADF returns
the ADF on
forwhether
a decision
whether
to approve or
thesubsequently
request, andthe
subsequently
theeither
ADF
“yes”
or
“no”
as
appropriate.
The
enforcement
of
this
decision
takes
place
at
the
AEF.
Our
reference
returns either “yes” or “no” as appropriate. The enforcement of this decision takes place at the AEF.
monitor
is similar
but differs
in the
thatdetails
of ISOfrom
reference
We incorporate
Our reference
monitor
is similar
butdetails
differsfrom
in the
that ofmonitor.
ISO reference
monitor. the
We
role-based
access
control
to
handle
the
authorization
rule.
Figure
12
shows
the
conceptual
structure
of
incorporate the role-based access control to handle the authorization rule. Figure 12 shows the
the
RBAC/CR
reference
monitor.
As
Figure
12
shows,
any
request
to
access
any
smart
grid
resource
conceptual structure of the RBAC/CR reference monitor. As Figure 12 shows, any request to access
“i.e.,
intercepted
thedata”
AEF.isBefore
makingbyany
the making
AEF forwards
the request
any user
smartdata”
grid is
resource
“i.e., by
user
intercepted
thedecisions,
AEF. Before
any decisions,
the
to
the
ADF,
which
in
turn
adheres
to
the
RBAC
policy
decision
of
whether
to
grant
or
reject
the
AEF forwards the request to the ADF, which in turn adheres to the RBAC policy decision of whether
authorization
request.
will allow
authorization
of anallow
activeauthorization
(subject) entity
certain
to grant or reject
the RBAC
authorization
request.
RBAC will
of to
anexecute
active a(subject)
right
passivea(resource)
entity
if the subject
belongs
a role
RBAC has
previously
assign
entityontoaexecute
certain right
ononly
a passive
(resource)
entitytoonly
if that
the subject
belongs
to a role
that
that
right
to.
The
rest
of
the
decision
process
by
AEF
would
continue
only
if
RBAC
grants
authorization.
RBAC has previously assign that right to. The rest of the decision process by AEF would continue
Otherwise,
process
is stopped
and response
by theprocess
ADF is negative
(noand
authorization).
only if RBAC
grants
authorization.
Otherwise,
is stopped
response byFurthermore,
the ADF is
RBAC
allow
authorization
after
it
tests
other
decision
factors,
mainly,
hierarchal
relationships
and
negative (no authorization). Furthermore, RBAC allow authorization after it tests other decision
constraints.
For
example,
if
the
condition
for
granting
authorization
is
met
(i.e.,
the
request
is
within
factors, mainly, hierarchal relationships and constraints. For example, if the condition for granting
the
range of theisallowed
operating
time),
thethe
ADF
returns
a positive
response
“Authorize”
to the
authorization
met (i.e.,
the request
is then
within
range
of the
allowed
operating
time), then
the
AEF,
otherwise
request
is
denied.
ADF returns a positive response “Authorize” to the AEF, otherwise request is denied.
Access Enforcement Facility
(AEF)
Updating
Module

Request

Response

Monitoring
Module

Services
and
Operations

Authorization
Module
(RBAC)
Policies Database

Access Decision Facility
(ADF)

Figure 12.
12. Conceptual
Conceptual Structure
Structure for
forRBAC/CR
RBAC/CR Reference
Figure
Reference Monitor.
Monitor.

6. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we surveyed how cognitive radio as a mean of communication can be utilized to
serve a smart grid deployment from home area networks to power generation. We discussed the
motivations behind this and showed how cognitive radio can be mapped to integrate the different
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6. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we surveyed how cognitive radio as a mean of communication can be utilized to
serve a smart grid deployment from home area networks to power generation. We discussed the
motivations behind this and showed how cognitive radio can be mapped to integrate the different
communication networks in smart grid. Furthermore, we defined and discussed various applications
in smart grid and how cognitive radio can be used to fulfill their communication requirements. From a
security perspective, in this paper, we discussed the information security issues pertained to the use of
cognitive radio in a smart grid environment and at different levels and layers and suggested mitigation
techniques. Furthermore, we introduced an access control model based on RBAC and integrated it
with cognitive radio-based communication in order to specify and enforce access policies for securely
utilize the cognitive radio as part of a smart grid communication network. We have demonstrated that
our approach can be simple, but yet powerful enough in controlling access to system resources in an
environment, which is hierarchically structured such as this. For our future work, we intend to address
implementation issues of RBAC in the context of smart grid. We will show how the assignments of
users to roles and the assignments of permissions to roles are done. In addition, we will include an
architecture, and implementation of such a model and simulate its performance.
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